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Introduction  
Bulgarian welfare system was significantly changed in the late 1990’s and in early 2000’s 
following the whole economic and political changes since the collapse of communist system. On 
the next lines an attempt to summarize the most important changes in the Bulgarian economy in 
the early 2000’s is made. The accent is put on the welfare system and social inclusion. The 
reforms in the pension system and in the system concerning the employment policy in Bulgaria 
are at the center of the research since these two spheres appeared to be the most sensitive to the 
changes that took place at that time.  
We have organized our study chronologically according to according to the main stages 
of Bulgarian economy development:  early transition and prior to the crisis in 1997 (part 1), after 
the Currency Board introduction (part 2). Part 3 is especially dedicated to the employment policy 
and part 4 deals with the welfare system after EU integration and in the crisis years.  
 
I Bulgarian welfare system in the early transition and prior to Currency Board 
introduction (1989-1997) 
After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Bulgarian industry needed a 
transformation, whose aim was to allow the existence of private property, to restructure the loss 
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generating state factories and to introduce a price system that reflects the demand and supply of 
the produced goods and services, this way to overcome the constant deficits typical for the 
planned economy. Bulgarian economy was strongly connected with COMECON countries and 
mostly with the USSR. In the early 1990’s Bulgarian policymakers were not fully convinced in 
unavoidability of the reforms. They made efforts to prolong the existence of some ineffective 
state factories and in this way tried to save jobs of many industrial workers and those working in 
state administration. The result was severe indebtedness of the inefficient state companies. The 
liabilities were met mostly by using unconventional monetary instruments. That was a 
controversial policy of loss monetization that boosted inflation in the mid 1990’s and resulted in 
hyperinflation and huge banking crisis in 1997
1
. 
 Finally the delayed economic reforms had to take place. One of the fundamental changes 
that were introduced in 1998 was the implementation of a Currency Board system that used to fix 
the exchange rate of Bulgarian lev to the German mark (later to euro) and total abolishment of 
discretionary monetary policy. The profound character of this reform marked most of the policy 
measures undertaken in the following years in country’s economy and in social security system 
as an inseparable part of it.  
 
The strong discipline effect of Currency Board exerts on the government and the central 
bank made possible the implementation of difficult but needed reforms concerning privatization 
of state assets, taxation, and changes in social sphere basically in pension system
2
. In the early 
1990’s the welfare system in Bulgaria was financed totally with state budget funds. The state 
used to take care of all social security services then provided. The economic crises affected both 
the revenue and the expenditure side of the system. The officially reported GDP of the country 
plunged with some 40% for the period 1990 – 1997 
 
Table 1: GDP for the period: 1990-1997 (in USD)  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
                                                          
1
 For general survey on Bulgarian reforms see Dobrinsky (2000) and Vutcheva (2012).  
2
 For more on the crisis and Currency board functioning see Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003), Nenovsky and 
Berlemann (2004), Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2003), Nenovsky (2008) and Ialnazov (2003). 
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GDP per capita  1163 945 1015 1278 1150 1564 1190 1251 
GDP per capita in PPP*  5170 4740 4660 4800 5020 5380 5020 5920 
Annual change (in %) -9,1 -11,7 -7,3 -1,5 1,8 2,9 -9,4 -5,6 
*Purchasing power parity 
Source: Bulgarian central bank www.bnb.bg , National Statistics Institute www.nsi.bg  
 
The severe shock on the country’s real economy influenced adversely the unemployment 
rate which jumped up significantly. 
Table 2: Unemployment rate: 1990-1997 (in %)  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Unemployment 
rate  
2.9 6.8 13.2 15.8 14.1 11.4 11.0 14.0 
Source: IMF, World economic Outlook, April 2014 
 
The figures shown imply that the pressure on the revenue side of the state budged was 
tremendous. At the same time the raising number of unemployed individuals influenced 
negatively the expenditure side of the budget as well. Some populist decisions taken by the 
government at that time also contributed to the increasing deficit. For example, many of those 
left without a job were allowed to retire in preferential terms. The financial burden of all social 
security services supplied only by the state at that time was getting unbearable. It was a logical 
step to inflate the means necessary for the payment of all benefits which were governmentally 
provided. So the inflation rate high rocketed: 
 
Table 3: Inflation rate: 1991-1997 (in %)  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Inflation rate  473.7 79.4 63.9 121.9 32.7 311.6 547.7 
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Source: National statistics institute, www.nsi.bg 
  
The severe economic crises from the late 1990’s put under pressure Bulgarian policy 
makers. They realized the necessity of fundamental economic changes in almost every sphere of 
the society. So the newly elected government in 1997 started reforms which were significantly 
delayed in time. Decisive measures were needed in pension system (the average pension amount 
at that time was at around 5 USD per month), health care system and employment policy system 
in order to prevent them from total collapse. After the introduction of a currency board system in 
July 1
st
 1997 and the resulted stabilization in inflation rates, the government undertook important 
steps to restructure the aforementioned social spheres.  
 
II  
Welfare system development after the crisis and Currency Board introduction  
 
The most profound reforms were made in pension system since it was absorbing the 
greatest part of the resources destined for social security. The system was embracing many 
people whose pension amounts were greatly reduced as a result of the hyperinflation. At the 
same time an adverse fundamental process was taking place whose negative effect was expecting 
to hit the pension system dramatically in medium and long term – the aging of the population.  
In the early 1990’s two trends started to affect negatively the demographic structure of 
the Bulgarian society – emigration and lowered birth rates. After the collapse of the communist 
regime the borders were opened and many young Bulgarians saw an opportunity to continue 
their professional careers abroad. At the same time the economic difficulties in the country 
prevented lots of families to give birth of more than one child. These two adverse tendencies 
have been continuing to exert pressure on the pension system for many years.  
In the late 1990’s the social security system functioned solely on pay-as-you-go basis so 
that  the rising unemployment and emigration rates directly affected the revenue side of the state 
budged and from there the possibility for paying adequate pension amounts. Following the 
recommendations of the World Bank and the IMF, Bulgarian government started both parametric 
and structural reforms of the current pension system. The aim of the first type of reforms was to 
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strengthen the financial health of the system in short term while the ultimate goal of the second 
type was to improve long term prospects of the pension system in Bulgaria.  
The parametric reforms included the introduction of the so called point system in 
retirement whose aim was to raise the legal requirements for receiving pension by the state social 
security. The insured individuals needed to meet both age and contributory service criteria in 
order to obtain right for a pension benefit. Before this transformation the insured individuals had 
to reach only a predetermined specific age – 55 for women and 60 for men. The point system, 
introduced in Bulgarian pension system in 2000, required the sum formed by age and years of 
contributory service of the insured individuals to be 98 for men and 88 for women. At the same 
time the legal retirement age was raised by six months for both sexes - 55 years and 6 months for 
women and 60 years and 6 months for men. The adopted pension legislation envisaged a gradual 
increase both in retirement age and in points required for both sexes. Each year beginning from 
1
st
 of January 2001 the age needed had to increase by 6 months until it reaches 60 years for 
women and 63 years for men. At the same time the points required had to grow with 1 each year 
until they reach 94 for women and 100 for men. In 2011 the point system in pension insurance 
was eliminated and it was replaced by separately defined requirements for age and years of 
contributory service – 63 years of age and 37 years of contributory service for men and 60 years 
of age and 34 years of contributory service for women.  
Other parametric reforms included the removal of some advantages designed to benefit 
certain types of professions such as military servicemen, policemen and people working in heavy 
labor conditions such as mine workers, metallurgists etc.   All these reforms undertaken and 
applied in Bulgarian pension system aimed to relax the constantly rising financial burden on the 
state PAYG pension system. It is well known that the return to PAYG systems depends on two 
factors
3
 – dependency ratio (contributing workers to pensioners) and the growth of average 
earnings which determines the growth in total contributions. A continuous deterioration in 
dependency ratio could put an increasing strain on pay-as-you-go system. This negative trend is 
typical for many countries in the World but it has an extreme character in Bulgaria. This is seen 
from the following table: 
  
                                                          
3
 Davis (1995).  
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Table 4: Number of contributing workers and pensioners for the period 2009 – 2013  
                                                      (in thousands) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of contributing workers 3254 3053 2965 2934 2935 
Number of pensioners 1696 1697 1696 1698 1667 
 
The dependency ratio in Bulgaria is less than 2:1 which means that the current PAYG pension 
system exerts a severe pressure on public finances. However the average pension amount has 
been increasing constantly since 2000 mostly thanks to the increasing contributory income of the 
working individuals. It’s worth noting also that contributory rate for pension insurance had been 
lowered several times for the period 2000 – 2010. In 2011 there was a slight increase in this rate 
but it could be assumed as an exception that proves the rule. 
 
Table 5: Contributory income and contributory rate for pension for the period 2002-2013 
Year Average monthly 
contributory income (euro) 
Rate of increase of average 
monthly contributory income 
Contributory 
rate for 
pension 
2002 132.81  27% 
2003 143.55 8.09% 27% 
2004 157.89 9.99% 26% 
2005 169.55 7.39% 26% 
2006 181.25 6.90% 19% 
2007 203.58 12.32% 18% 
2008 255.93 25.72% 17% 
2009 283.65 10.83% 13% 
2010 291.61 2 .80% 11% 
2011 303.78 4.18% 12.80% 
2012 316.01 4.02% 12.80% 
2013 331.69 4.96% 12.80% 
Source: National Social Security Institute, www.nssi.bg 
 
The average pension amount in Bulgaria has been increasing but it is still far from adequate to 
the economic conditions. The average replacement rate is at about 40% which means that 
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Bulgarian retirees are facing a significant decrease in their income just after their retirement. It’s 
not a surprise that all those pensioners who have an opportunity to keep their jobs after 
retirement, choose to stay at work and be active. In order to improve the perspective of receiving 
a higher pension amount and to raise the average replacement rate, Bulgarian policymakers made 
also a very significant structural reform in the late 1990s. Following the recommendations of the 
World Bank
4
 they introduced a three pillar pension system. The first pillar constitutes the state 
PAYG system. It continues to absorb the greatest part of the resources but it has been 
complemented by second and third pillars which have been functioning on a fully funded 
principle. The second pillar is the so called supplementary compulsory pension insurance and it 
embraces two types of funds – universal pension funds and occupational pension funds. All 
insured individuals born after 31.12.1959 are obliged to make contributions into a universal 
pension fund of their own choice. Insured individuals who work in heavy conditions such as 
mine workers must contribute in occupational pension fund as well. The undertaken change is 
accepted as an important structural reform since its ultimate aim is to manage the expected 
severe shortfall in the current PAYG system. The third pillar of the system is the so called 
supplementary voluntary pension insurance. All individuals over the age of 16 years could make 
contributions in a pension fund of their own choice. Both compulsory and voluntary pension 
funds manage defined contribution pension schemes where the investment risk is borne by the 
insured individual. 
The introduction of a system that functions on a fully funded principle was a serious 
challenge for the Bulgarian regulators. The implementation of a compulsory second pillar in a 
country where the capital market has been just started with low liquidity and a few financial 
instruments suitable for investment vehicles for this type of institutions imposes many risks both 
on insured individuals and pension companies. The lack of traditions in pension insurance of this 
kind was also an obstacle with unforeseeable consequences as no one was sure whether the 
public would support the reform. The regulators had to reflect all these constraints into the rules 
supposed to govern the newly formed pension insurance companies. So it was of a little surprise 
that they gave a priority to strict investment regulation. During the first years of their existence, 
pension insurance companies from the second pillar of the system were obliged to invest 
                                                          
4
 World Bank (1994).  
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minimum 50% of their assets into government bonds. The investment constraints concerning the 
universal and occupational pension funds in Bulgaria were the following: 
 
Table 6: Investment limits concerning second pillar pension funds in Bulgaria until 2006 
 Instrument Investment limit 
1. Government bonds Min. 50% 
2. Bank deposits Max. 25% 
3. Corporate bonds Max. 20% 
4. Corporate equities Max. 10% 
5. Mortgage bonds Max. 30% 
6. Municipal bonds Max. 10% 
7. Investment property Max. 5% 
8. Foreign instruments Max. 20% 
Source: Social security code, 2000 
 
By adopting such investment limits the legislator was clearly trying to prevent pension 
companies from assuming risky investments in their initial years of operation. At the same time 
these rules were aiming to convince the insured individuals in the financial security of the 
system. The last was very important because many people suffered huge money losses from their 
“investments” in some financial pyramids, very popular in the mid 1990’s in Bulgaria. This type 
of investment regulation was reasonable for the first years of operation of the Bulgarian pension 
funds. But it is well-known from financial theory that low-risk instruments are associated with 
low return. Pension funds are long term investors and they have some comparative advantages in 
investments on capital markets. Variable income assets are more volatile in value than fixed 
income instruments but their yield tend to exceed that of bonds especially in the long term.  
One of the most important risks that face insured individuals in a funded pension system 
is the inflation risk. If pension funds were not able to compensate the insured for the lost 
purchasing power of their accumulated savings they would not serve the aim for which they were 
established. That’s why it was very important Bulgarian pension funds to extend their 
investments in corporate instruments such as equities and bonds in order to increase their 
chances of achieving a positive real return in the long horizon. In 2006 some very important 
changes were introduced in pension fund investment regulations partly because of the upcoming 
membership in European Union in 2007. Many of the limits were relaxed and the existing 
minimum requirement for investments in government debt was removed. 
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Table 7: Current investment limits concerning second pillar pension funds in Bulgaria  
 Instrument Investment limit 
1. Government bonds No limit 
2. Bank deposits Max. 25% 
3. Corporate bonds Max. 25% 
4. Corporate equities Max. 20% 
5. Shares and/or units issued by collective investment schemes Max. 15% 
6 Shares in special purpose investment company Max. 5% 
7. Mortgage bonds Max. 30% 
8. Municipal bonds Max. 15% 
9. Investment property Max. 5% 
10. Investments in assets denominated in currency different from lev and euro Max. 20% 
Source: Social security code, 2007 
 
All these changes used to have a positive impact on pension funds. They were able to 
restructure their asset portfolios short after the implementation of the new regulations. The 
portfolio share of government bonds was significantly reduced on account of that of corporate 
instruments. Before this alteration some funds used to invest almost 80% of their resources into 
government debt. This could be assumed as a shortcoming because the pension system was 
changed in order to supplement the PAYG system with some funded components. But if pension 
funds predominantly invest in government debt many of the advantages of the funded pension 
system could be seriously undermined in the long term. The restructuring of the asset portfolios 
in the late 2006 and during the whole 2007 coincided with the extreme price increases at the 
Bulgarian stock exchange.  
Many portfolio investors not only pension funds but also banks, insurance companies and 
mutual funds located in the country were eager to put some money into the fast growing 
Bulgarian equity market. In 2007 pension funds were able to realize a double digit return which 
was varying between 13.51% and 24.91% for the different universal pension funds. The average 
officially announced yield was 17.19%. This was a huge number which was possible only 
because of the investments made on the capital market that year. The asset price balloon was 
clearly formed and when the financial crises hit the country in the following year the results were 
devastating. The main stock price index (Sofix) plunged with some 80% and the losses reported 
by pension funds for 2008 were great. The stock market crash was able to sweep away more than 
20% of the savings amount accumulated by the insured individuals. The average announced loss 
was -21.14% for all universal pension funds as one of the funds published -29.31%.  
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These disappointing results marked the development of the pension funds in the next 
years. The insured individuals realized that their savings were not guaranteed and they bore 
significant risks
5
. The problem was the most serious for those individuals insured in a voluntary 
pension fund whose retirement was coming close. The pension funds were having no chance to 
compensate them for a year or two. The insured had to make a tough choice - pension amounts 
should be reduced or otherwise they needed to work some extra years. The insured individuals in 
universal pension funds were having the advantage their retirement to be in a more distant future. 
The first who are going to get pension from this type of funds are those born in 1960 whose 
retirement is planned for the years after 2020.  
The crises showed clearly that pension funds in Bulgaria should be allowed to construct 
asset portfolios with different risk profiles. The so called multifund system has been established 
in a number of countries in Latin America (Chile, Peru, Columbia, etc.) and in Central Europe 
(Slovakia, Poland, Hungary until 2012), but not in Bulgaria. The crises demonstrated that the risk 
that faces individuals with long and those with short investment horizon is different. If the 
insured has planned his or her retirement for the next 2 or 3 years the portfolio portion invested 
in secure instruments should be much larger than it used to be in 2008. At the same time those 
insured that have just started their professional carrier should have the opportunity to invest more 
aggressively in a portfolio containing variable income instruments whose yield is more likely to 
exceed the inflation rate in the long term.  
 All changes that were made at the beginning of the new century were consistent with the 
regulations of the European Union. Unfortunately some of the reforms were delayed in time; 
others have not been introduced yet, some others have been stopped. For example in 2011 the 
ruling party adopted a regulation that stipulated a gradual increase both in pension age and 
contributory service required for retirement. As a result the age needed for receiving pension 
benefit was planned to increase by 4 months each year until it reaches 65 years for men and 63 
years for women. The required contributory service was also planned to increase by 4 months 
each successive calendar year until it touches 40 years for men and 37 years for women. This 
normative rule was in force only for two years (2012 and 2013).  
In 2013 the new ruling coalition stopped the reform and froze the envisaged increase for 
one year. All this shows how difficult is to implement painful reforms and how much important 
                                                          
5
 Blake (2006) 
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is to vote such changes only in the presence of widespread public support. It is crucial for the 
success of any long term decision to be accepted by all participants in the political life in the 
country. Pension system requires long term rules otherwise it is doomed to failure. Another 
reform which is still subject only to hot discussions is the introduction of the multifund system 
within the second and third pillar of the pension insurance. The establishment of several asset 
portfolios with a different risk profile is an important measure that will underpin the pension 
funds in Bulgaria and will reduce the risk that faces insured individuals in the long term. At the 
same time the introduction of such system will involve the insured much deeper in the process of 
accumulating assets for retirement. Currently three portfolio options have been discussing – a 
conservative, balanced and aggressive one. They will differ by the portion invested in variable 
income instruments. Having a choice, the insured must take the responsibility for their pension 
savings. One of the serious problems of the system today is that young persons are not interested 
in their future pension benefits and they have left the decisions of this type totally to the state. 
Multifund system has the potential to change this disturbing feature of today’s working 
generations. Of course, the normative rules in this area must be constructed carefully in order to 
prevent the insured from taking decisions that can harm and not protect their interests.  
 
III  
Employment policy  
 Another important social system that was significantly changed in the 2000’s concerns 
the employment policy in Bulgaria. In the late 1990’s the economy suffered a severe decline as a 
result of the lack of reforms which were needed in order to restructure some big but inefficient 
state factories which were not able to function in a competitive environment. After the 
hyperinflation that evolved in 1997, the newly elected government started a process of 
privatization of state assets. As a result many workers lost their job and were not able to switch 
fast to a new one because the structure of Bulgarian economy was different. Many state factories 
were sold and after that were just cut into scrap. There was no market for the products they used 
to produce for decades and the state budged was not able to support them any more especially in 
such strict monetary conditions imposed by the currency board system introduced in the same 
period. So the greatest part of the unemployment which reached the level of nearly 18% at that 
time was a structural one.  
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Table 8: Unemployment rate: 1998-2001 (in %)  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Unemployment rate  12.2 16.0 17.9 17.3 
Source: Statistics Review, 2002, published by Bulgarian National Statistical Institute 
 
The government put into place both passive and active measures in order to reverse this 
negative trend. The passive instruments include certain benefits and payments destined for all 
those individuals left without a job. The active measures embrace different educational and 
qualification programs whose ultimate aim is to raise the skills and professional knowledge of 
the unemployed.  The provision of temporary and permanent employment is also part of the 
active measures undertaken by the so called Employment agency which is responsible for the 
implementation of the government policy in this area.  
In early 2000’s new legislation was adopted in this field and as a result a special fund was 
established. The so called unemployment fund, together with the pension fund, the employment 
injury and occupational diseases fund and the common disease and maternity fund have formed 
the first pillar of the Bulgarian social security system. Each of these funds has its own budget. 
All of them are financed by special contributions that are paid by all working individuals and 
their employers and the resources are used on a solidarity basis. The contributory rate for the 
unemployment fund has been changed several times for the years after 2000.  
 
Table 9: Contributory rates due by the employees and their employers for the 
unemployment fund for the period 2002 - 2014 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Contributory rate 
“unemployment 
fund” 
4% 4% 4% 3.5% 3% I-IX - 3%, 
X-XII - 1% 
1% 1% 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Contributory rate 
“unemployment 
fund” 
1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Source: National Social Security Institute,  www.nssi.bg 
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Initially the contribution is divided between the employer and his/her employee at a ratio 
of 80:20. It has also been changed a couple of times for all these years and currently it is 60:40. 
The means of this special fund have been spent for financing certain benefits for the individuals 
left without a job. Cash unemployment benefit is paid to those persons for whom social 
insurance contributions have been paid or are due with the unemployment fund for at least nine 
months out of the last fifteen months preceding the termination of the social insurance
6
. The 
unemployed must also have a registration with the National Employment Agency and he/she 
must not have been granted a pension benefit. The exact procedure for determining the amount 
of the benefit has been changed slightly during the years. It is estimated as 60% of the average 
daily wage on which contributions have been paid or are due for the period of 18 calendar 
months preceding the month in which insurance was terminated. It is important to note that 
currently unemployment cash benefit is not constrained by upper limit.  This was not the case for 
many years. Each year the parliament used to vote a maximum daily amount of this type of 
benefit valid for the next calendar year. In this way individuals insured on a high amount of 
income were not allowed to receive an adequate to their paid contributions benefit.  
This normative rule was changed in 2010 and since then high income insured persons can 
get a benefit determined on the amount of their contributory income. The period used as a basis 
for determining the average daily wage of the insured has also been changed several times. 
Initially this period was fixed at nine months, but after that it was prolonged to twenty-four 
months and currently it is eighteen calendar months preceding the month of losing job. The 
number of months for which the insured has right for receiving this type of benefit depends on 
the period of contributory service: 
 
Table 10: Period for payment of cash unemployment benefit in Bulgaria 
Contributory service in years Period for payment of benefit in months 
Up to 3 4 
From 3 to 5 6 
From 5 to 10 8 
From 10 to 15 9 
                                                          
6
 See: Social insurance code, State Gazette No. 110/17.12.1999, effective 1.01.2000 
 
 
14 
 
From 15 to 20 10 
From 20 to 25 11 
Over 25 12 
Source: Social security code, 2000  
 
It is seen from the table above that the maximum period of time for which the insured has 
right for receiving unemployment cash benefit is 12 months. The longest period for payment of 
such benefit concerns those individuals with the longest record of contribution payments into the 
unemployment fund of the state social security system. If the insured has acquired an entitlement 
to a cash unemployment benefit prior to the lapse of three years from a preceding entitlement to 
such benefit, he or she has right to the minimum amount of the benefit for a period of four 
months. If the person is hired to work part time during the period of payment of the 
unemployment benefit and receives remuneration which is less than the national minimum wage, 
he/she has the right to the entitlement of 50% of the already determined unemployment benefit 
for the rest of the period.  
In addition to these passive measures, there are some active ones applied by the state 
employment agency, whose aim is to support unemployed with the whole process of finding a 
new job or acquiring some new skills necessary for the available positions. The activities of this 
state agency could be divided into seven groups: Information services for registered unemployed 
for the available vacancies; Mediation services for finding a new job; Professional consultancy 
services; Educational services; Financing programs and projects for subsidized employment for 
specific groups of unemployed persons; Providing stimuli for raising the employment level in the 
country (for the unemployed - to start a job and for the employers - to open new working 
positions); Administrative and information services concerning different EU programs in the 
sphere of employment and professional qualification. 
All these passive and active measures could have only a supportive rule in the process of 
opening new working positions and raising the level of employment. It is well known that in fact 
businesses and proprietors hold the leading position in developing the working environment and 
the creation of new job opportunities. That’s why the policymakers are trying to support the 
labor market with some indirect measures concerning exactly the business conditions in the 
country. For example there is a clear tendency of reducing the tax burden both on corporate and 
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personal income for the period after 2000. In this way the government is trying to reduce the 
costs of making business and at the same time to stimulate those businesses that operate in the 
“grey” economy and don’t pay any taxes to accept the rules and compete justly with the other 
participants at the market.  
 
Table 11: Marginal tax rate on corporate profits and personal income for the period 2001-
2013 
Year Marginal tax rate on corporate profits Marginal tax rate on personal income 
2001 28% 38% 
2002 23.5% 29% 
2003 23.5% 29% 
2004 19.5% 29% 
2005 15% 24% 
2006 15% 24% 
2007 10% 24% 
2008 10% 10% 
2009 10% 10% 
2010 10% 10% 
2011 10% 10% 
2012 10% 10% 
2013 10% 10% 
2014 10% 10% 
Source: National Revenue Agency, www.nap.bg 
 
It’s worth mentioning that some of the undertaken measures in the sphere of social policy 
have controversial effects on the labor market. In an effort to manage the grey sector of the 
economy, the Ministry of Labor and Social policy introduced the so called minimum 
contributory thresholds in 2003. The minimum contributory income is determined 
administratively and separately for each professional group and sector of the economy. These 
thresholds are used for estimating the contributions due for each of the funds of the state social 
security system, pension funds from the second pillar and for health insurance. Even if the 
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contracted wage is below the minimum contributory level, the employer and employee should 
pay contributions on the so determined threshold. The basic idea here is that if we have a “grey” 
sector in the economy, then a significant part of the employees receives wages on which no 
social security contributions are paid or they are paid but not in their full amount which is the 
most common case. The problem is how to determine the exact amount of these contributory 
thresholds. If they are too low then they’ll not accomplish the job for which they are invented. If 
they are too high then they could have an adverse effect on the labor market and to support the 
upward trend in the unemployment rate in the country. It’s hard to assess the effect these 
contributory thresholds have been exerting on the labor market since their inception in 2003. The 
years just after their introduction coincided with the boom years of the Bulgarian economy.   
There were many other factors which supported the observed increase in the amount of 
wages and in that of the paid social security contributions. This positive tendency was reversed 
in 2008 when the world financial crises hit Bulgarian economy as well. It’s important to mention 
that these contributory thresholds have never been reduced for the whole period after 2003. Even 
when the negative effects of the crises were on the surface and the unemployment rate started to 
move upward yet again, Bulgarian policymakers didn’t take any steps to relax the rising financial 
pressure on many businesses in the country. Contrary to that they were trying to compensate the 
declining revenues by increasing both the minimum contributory income and the legal minimum 
wage. The latter has been also constantly increasing since 2000 at rates which are not related to 
the labor productivity and the growth of the economy. 
 
Table 12: Minimum monthly wage in Bulgaria (in euro) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Minimum wage per month  34 43 51 56 61 77 82 92 
Rate of increase  26% 19% 10% 9% 25% 7% 13% 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Minimum wage per month 112 123 123 138 148 159 174 
Rate of increase 22% 9% 0% 13% 7% 7% 10% 
Source: National social security institute, www.nssi.bg, own calculation 
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The above table shows that the accumulated rate of increase of the monthly minimum wage is 
more than 176% for the whole period between 2000 and 2014. At the same time the growth rate 
of the officially reported GDP is much smaller: 
 
Table 13: Growth rate of the Bulgarian GDP (in %) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Growth rate 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Rate of increase 6.2 -5.5 0.4 1.8 0.6 0.9 
Source: National statistics institute, www.nsi.bg 
 
The level of minimum wage and contributory thresholds are fixed and valid for the whole 
country. There is no differentiation among regions. At the same time there is no economic 
equality among different regions in Bulgaria. There are areas where the unemployment levels are 
higher (e.g. north-west region of Bulgaria) so that the average monthly payments there tend to be 
lower than the levels in the other parts of the country. Raising the minimum wage without 
considering these variations, the government decreases artificially the differences between the 
average and minimum income in those areas. In this way it discourages further those individuals 
who are qualified and receive wages above the minimum ones. They have an extra stimulus to 
leave those regions and to look for a better payment in some other place. This negative tendency 
makes the economically underdeveloped territories in the country even more unattractive for 
businesses and hampers their social recovery.  
 
IV  
Welfare system in crisis years  
 The crisis of 2008 influenced quite negatively the labor market in the country. The 
economic slump was caused by the reduced amount of foreign investments which used to be the 
main growth engine during the years before 2008. The export oriented sectors of the economy 
also suffered because of the lowered demand for the products they were producing and selling at 
the EU market.  
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One of the businesses that were hurt seriously was the construction industry. There was a 
real boom in designing and building vacation complexes (hotels and apartments) in the sea and 
winter resorts of the country and business offices and residential buildings in the big cities. It 
was a logical result that many of the employed in this sector of the economy have lost their jobs. 
The construction industry used to absorb many of those with specific professional skills and 
comparatively low education. These individuals were hit the most by the effects of the crises. 
They were unable to switch fast into a new occupation. At the same time a significant part of 
those employed in building industry was not insured on the real wage. Many low paid workers 
preferred to receive part of their remuneration without paying social security contributions. In 
this way they were not able to qualify for a full unemployment benefit from the state social 
security fund. As a result of the crises the number of people exposed at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion has increased.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of people exposed at risk of poverty and social exclusion
7
 
 
   
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/  
 
The data in the above table shows that the number of the Bulgarians exposed to this specific risk 
has increased with almost 5 percentage points for the period 2008 – 2012. It’s much higher than 
                                                          
7
The Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion, in particular through the reduction of poverty, by aiming to lift at least 20 million people 
out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion. This indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty or severely materially 
deprived or living in households with very low work intensity. At risk-of-poverty are persons with an equivalised disposable income below the 
risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). Material deprivation 
covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by a 
lack of resources, they experience at least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep home 
adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week holiday away from home, 
vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a color TV, or ix) a telephone. People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-
59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work less than 20% of their total work potential during the past year. 
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the average rate of increase for the countries members of Euro area. Accordingly, the public 
expenditures on labor market policies have also increased for the period: 
 
 
 Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/8  
 
It’s worth noting that the greatest part of the increase is caused by the implemented 
passive measures, basically paid unemployment benefits. At the same time the statistics shows 
that the resources devoted to active measures have decreased both in proportion to GDP and in 
absolute value.  
 
 
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Expenditure on labor market policies (LMP) is limited to public interventions which are explicitly targeted at groups of persons with difficulties 
in the labor market: the unemployed, the employed at risk of involuntary job loss and inactive persons who would like to enter the labor market. 
Total expenditure is broken down into LMP services (category 1), which covers the costs of the public employment service (PES) together with 
any other publicly funded services for jobseekers; LMP measures (categories 2-7), which covers activation measures for the unemployed and 
other target groups including the categories of training, job rotation and job sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and 
rehabilitation, direct job creation, and start-up incentives; and LMP supports (categories 8-9), which covers out-of-work income maintenance and 
support (mostly unemployment benefits) and early retirement benefits. 
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Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
A possible reason behind this data could be the time needed for the implementation of 
new programs and services by the state administration as well as the period necessary for the 
public to learn and get used to the novelties. After 2010 there has been an upward trend in this 
type of expenditures which is a clear sign that the negative effects of the crises are still on the 
surface.  
Bulgarian policymakers are trying to support the labor market in the country by indirect 
measures as well– introducing some electronic services for communication with the unemployed, 
fostering proprietorship among them, elaborating some guarantee schemes for facilitating the 
access for financing. Unfortunately, the efficiency of the state administration is far from perfect 
and many of those looking for a job are dissatisfied with the opportunities they currently have for 
managing their unfavorable situation. Bulgarian government is constrained in its active policy 
measures because it must observe strictly its expenditures. The budget deficit should not surpass 
the limit of 3% of the GDP and the public debt must be kept under control if Bulgarian 
politicians want to keep the currency board system and the fixed exchange rate towards the euro.  
At the same time the limit of 3% budget deficit is the maximum level which the 
government should keep or the European commission could start a special penalty procedure for 
tolerating excess deficit and breaking the rules of the Stability and Growth pact. So in such 
situation the implementation of a typical Keynesian type policy is highly limited which means 
that the government cannot support the labor market with some short term measures whose 
efficiency, however, is controversial in the long term. The crisis was able to put the employment 
policy of the government under pressure. Notwithstanding the gradual recovery of the economy 
driven by the export oriented sectors has begun and the national statistics was able to register a 
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slight decrease in unemployment levels in the second quarter of 2014. The process of repairing 
the economy would be difficult and it requires coordinated efforts by all of the participating 
parties – government, businesses, and academics.  
  
Conclusion 
The reforms implemented within the Bulgarian social security system were aiming to establish a 
model which is similar in structure to the one that functions in Germany.  
For example, for each of the basic social security risks (old age and death, maternity and 
childcare, unemployment, occupational disease and employment injury) a distinct fund has been 
established within the pay-as-you-go first pillar of the system. A particular contribution has been 
defined for each of these funds. The benefits are to a great extent related to the contributions 
paid. In theory the social security system was separated by the state budget and accordingly by 
the resources collected via taxation. In practice, the system has been experiencing constant 
deficits for the last decade and it is effectively supported by state budget funds. At the same time 
a universal coverage of the system has been always a prerogative for the last 15 years. So the 
reality is that there are many exceptions by the rule that make possible even people without 
working history to receive certain benefits (pension, maternity, health care). The last concerns 
basically some minority groups within the society.   
Using Esping Andersen’s 1990’s classification Variety of Welfare Regime in Bulgaria, 
we can stand the position that it is a sort of a compromise between conservative and social 
democratic model
9
. Private institutions in this field have relatively short history of operation and 
with the exception of pension funds, the others manage small resources and don’t have great 
popularity in the country. Currently the role of the private sector for financing certain social 
security benefits is insignificant having in mind that even pension funds are still in their 
accumulation phase and accordingly the cash outflows are small.  
At the same time it is expected that the role of the privately managed institutions will 
grow in the next years and they will be able to support effectively the state organizations in 
supplying social security services. This concerns mainly pension security organization which has 
                                                          
9
 The East European welfare system could be interpreted in different way following the Nölke and Vliegenthart 
(2009) classification of East Europe as a Dependent Market Economy Capitalism, where fundamental dependence 
on foreign capital is observed. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) develop a different theory for European periphery 
diversity. In any case such research is a bulky task that we leave for another day. 
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been changed fundamentally and as a result a three pillar system was established. The 
implemented funded components are supposed to support the pension system in a moment when 
the aging of the population could cause enormous deficits in the PAYG system.  
The start of the reform was promising but after the crisis of 2008 it became clear that 
some further changes were needed. The insured individuals are exposed to significant risks 
within defined contribution pension schemes. So the right regulation of the pension fund 
investments should try to mitigate some future failures. At the same time the reforms within 
PAYG pillar of the system (e.g. rising the pension age, restricting the requirements for receiving 
benefits) must continue in order to soften the expected shortfall in the next years.  
The other very important reform in the social security system was implemented within 
the employment policy organization. Bulgarian economy structure was changed significantly 
after the collapse it went through in 1996-1997 and as a result the unemployment level rose in 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The policymakers were trying to manage this structural 
unemployment by adopting both active and passive measures but their efforts were constrained 
by a number of factors. The social inclusion of some “risky” groups of the population (those with 
no or low education, low qualification and professional skills) are and will be at the center of the 
policy measures.  
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